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ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
Vol. XVI APRIL, 1931 No. 3
LEGAL TECHNIQUE AND NATIONAL CONTROL OF THE
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
BY RALPH F. FUCHS
I. THE FATALIST VIEWPOINT
Physical waste and economic distress in the petroleum indus-
try have recently been called to public attention in ways which
have made the subject familiar to many newspaper readers.
Among participants in the industry there has been a demand for
its control on a national scale. While this demand is typical of
agitation regarding a number of industries that are functioning
badly, it is rendered the more insistent in the oil industry by the
acuteness of certain conditions peculiar to the extraction of
petroleum. Nevertheless there seems to be little disposition to
believe that the demand can be met, for legal and constitutional
obstacles are deemed to stand in the way of national control. Of
late the industry has contented itself with local efforts at con-
trolling production and with the promotion of an interstate com-
pact to handle matters on a broader scale.' It is the purpose of
this article to suggest 2 that a proper understanding of the legal
techniques employed in court decisions upon industrial control
would eliminate much of the fatalism which accepts legal and
constitutional obstacles to national control as unchangeable.
Whether an interstate compact is a preferable means of taking
the situation in hand is, of course, not under discussion here.
See Lippincott, Troubles of the Oil Industry, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,
Apr. 7, 1931 p. B2, for an excellent summary of the present situation.
'Limitations of time make a thorough study impossible.
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II. LEGAL OBSTACLES TO NATIONAL CONTROL
Control of the petroleum industry on a national scale could
come about in one of four ways.3 A merger of corporations, in-
volving substantially the entire industry, might be undertaken.
An association of oil companies, with power to establish and en-
force general policies for its members, might be formed. The
Federal government might step in with a comprehensive scheme
of regulation involving the licensing of oil wells or of shipments
in interstate commerce.4  Or, finally, some form of merger or
association of oil companies might be accompanied by super-
vision at the hands of a Federal agency.5
The foregoing brief statements do not, of course, begin to de-
fine the precise powers or types of administrative machinery
that would be employed under each form of control. Indeed an
almost infinite variety is possible under each form. Thus a
merger of oil companies might be accomplished by the formation
of a holding company or by the complete absorption of existing
companies into a new business unit. In either event manage-
'That is, assuming that current modes of organization and habits of
thought will not be revolutionized. In order to formulate a plan which
would go to the roots of existing evils, further possibilities would have to
be considered. The analogous problems of the bituminous coal industry
have been attacked in this fundamental manner. See HAMILTON AND
WRIGHT, A WAY OF ORDER FOR BITUaTINOVS COAL (1928) reviewed 14 ST.
Louis L. Rsv. 341. Here, however, where the purpose is simply to survey
the legal status of certain proposals that stand a chance of adoption in
the near future, it is unnecessary to venture far beyond the limits of the
familiar.
' The U. S. Coal Commission of 1922 recommended Federal licensing of
shippers and buyers of coal in interstate commerce. HAIILTON & WRIGHT,
op. cit. n. 3 above, 325; HUNT, WHAT THE CoAL ComiissioN FOUND (1925)
404.
'A "Committee of Nine," composed of three members of the Section on
Mineral Law of the American Bar Association, three representatives of the
American Petroleum Institute, and three representatives of the Federal Oil
Conservation Board, recommended in 1928 that Congress enact a statute
adopting such a scheme for use in emergencies. The proposed law specified
that agreements among producers of oil to curtail production during
periods of overproduction should not be deemed to violate the anti-trust
acts. It was provided that periods of overproduction should be deemed
to exist only when declared by the Federal Oil Conservation Board. Thus
the latter body, created in 1924 to study the petroleum situation and report
upon it, was to be entrusted with limited regulatory powers. The Board
consists of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Commerce, and the Interior. See
53 A.B. A. Rep. 637.
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ment might be highly concentrated or left in the hands of rel-
atively autonomous subsidiary companies or regional subdi-
visions. Under the second plan the nominally independent com-
panies might surrender much power or little to the association
which they formed by agreement. Such an organization might
budget production and fix prices, assessing penalties for non-
conformity, or confine itself to carrying on cooperative under-
takings for the prevention of waste in production. Federal con-
trol, whether of a competitively or non-competitively organized
industry, might be limited to enforcing technically sound meth-
ods of production or might extend to price fixing and determining
the purposes for which petroleum might be used. But each form
of national control, whether applied drastically or only to a
limited extent, would raise the doubts as to legality or constitu-
tionality which are referred to above."
It is, of course, the anti-trust acts 7 which are the real or sup-
posed bar to the industry's uniting in an effort to control the
overproduction which is the outstanding evil at the present time.
Not only are there the words of the acts themselves, warning
against contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of
trade, but there rests upon the industry the shadow of the
Standard Oil decree," dissolving the combination that existed
In the spring of 1929 the American Petroleum Institute, composed of
representatives of the larger oil companies, advanced a proposal which
doubtless would have formed the starting point for continued national con-
trol by these companies in so far as their economic power would have per-
mitted. It was agreed that the companies represented in the Institute would
limit their 1929 production to the level of 1928, provided the Federal Oil
Conservation Board would give its sanction to the plan. A request from
the Secretary of the Interior brought from the Attorney-General the opin-
ion that the Board had no power to pass on any such proposal and that the
oil companies could not obtain advance assurance against prosecution under
the anti-trust acts for any schemes they might enter into. N. Y. TIMES,
Apr. 4, 1929, 1:3. At the same time the administration was reported to be
opposed to any modification of the anti-trust acts in favor of the oil com-
panies, since the displacement of enforced competition would doubtless
have to be accompanied by the creation of a new regulatory commission-a
highly undesirable outcome in the eyes of the President. Ibid. Apr. 3,
1929, 1:3.
'Chiefly the Sherman Act (1890) 26 Stat. 209, 15 U. S. C. sec. 1, the
Federal Trade Commission Act (1914) 38 Stat. 717, 15 U. S. C. see. 41, and
the Clayton Act (1914) 38 Stat. 730, 15 U. S. C. sec. 12.
1 U. S. v. Standard Oil Co. (1909) 173 Fed. 177, aff'd (1911) 221 U. S. 1.
It seems likely that mergers in the oil industry could be effected with-a high
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prior to 1911 and forbidding its re-creation. Federal regulation,
on the other hand, meets with two constitutional obstacles--the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and the doctrine that
proddction and manufacture are not subject to control by Con-
gress in the exercise of its power to regulate interstate commerce."
III. PRIVATE CONTROL AND THE ANTI-TRUST ACTS
The Supreme Court, since announcing in the Standard Oil's
and American Tobacco" cases that only unreasonable contracts
and combinations in restraint of trade are illegal under the Sher-
man Act, has stated that certain practices are per se unreason-
able and in violation of the Act. United States ,v. Trenton Pot-
teries Co." was a prosecution of the parties to a trade associa-
tion which fixed the prices upon vitreous pottery bathroom
fixtures. It was held that the defendants were not entitled to
have the jury in the district court pass upon the reasonableness
of their prices. It was enough to sustain the convictions that
prices were found to have been. fixed. "The reasonable price
fixed today may . . . become the unreasonable price of tomor-
row. . . Agreements which create such potential power may
well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or unlawful re-
degree of success if the matter could be approachdd de novo. In other in-
dustries the anti-trust acts have not been a bar to mergers that have re-
sulted in almost monopoly control. U. S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.
(1918) 247 U. S. 32; U. S. v. U. S. Steel Corp. (1920) 251 U. S. 417; U. S. v.
International Harvester Co. (1927) 274 U. S. 693. So largely is this true
that some commentators have concluded that the anti-trust acts have
largely ceased to be a deterrent to industrial mergers. NATIONAL INDUS-
TRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, MERGERS AND THE LAW (1929) 80-82, 148-153;
KEEzER & MAY, THE PUBLIC CONTROL OF BUSINESS (1930) 42-50. The
illegality of the Standard Oil combination is explainable in terms of the
piratical tactics employed in building it up and perhaps also in terms of
the early public attitude of hostility toward large-scale business. The
Supreme Court may have reflected that attitude in the Standard Oil de-
cision and later, as public opinion changed, have modified its own views.
Whatever the reason, the petroleum industry, like the meat-packing in-
dustry [Swift & Co. v. U. S. (1928), 276 U. S. 311], is under a continuing
judicial control in all matters involving possible violation of the dissolution
decree.
°Const. Art. I, Sec. 8, Clause 3.
N. 8 above.
(1911) 221 U. S. 106.
(1927) 273 U. S. 392.
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straints."'1  And in another case14 the activities of a trade
association in the hardwood lumber industry were enjoined upon
the ground simply that an intention to maintain prices and limit
production had been manifested. Only in a dissenting opinion:'
was attention paid to conditions in the industry which may have
justified what the association was doing.
In view of such decisions-1 it is not surprising that it should
have become the general opinion that circumstances cannot in
the eyes of the courts justify price fixing or curtailing of pro-
duction by associations of competitors. 7 Nor is it to be won-
dered at that the men who conduct the petroleum industry,
where curtailment of production is the crying need of the hour,
should fight shy of taking the risks incident to endeavoring to
meet that need.1" With a comprehensive merger largely ruled
out in advance,1 9 the road to national control of itself by the
industry appears to many to be blocked. Serious students, how-
ever, envisage a larger field for trade association activities than
the language of some past decisions would indicate ;20 and suc-
cessful lawyers have proceeded upon the assumption that the
anti-trust laws will be construed with sufficient flexibility to ac-
commodate them to changing business situations.21 To a con-
siderable extent history supports these views.
"Ibid. at 397.
"American Column & Lumber Co. v. U. S. (1921) 257 U. S. 377.
" Written by Brandeis, J. and concurred in by McKenna and Holmes, J3.
"Decisions which point the other way are noted below.
" NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, TRADE ASSOCIATIONS AND
THE LAW (1925) cc. V & VI.
"N. 4 above.
IN. 6 above.
SKIRSCH, TRADE ASSOCIATIONS-THE LEGAL AsPECTs (1928), while recog-
nizing the force of precedents such as the Trenton Potteries case, points out
(at p. 28) that: "The stabilization of price levels, arising from economic
laws and not from artificial agreements, and the elimination of industrial
waste and inefficiency with their attendant evil consequences, could not long
be the subject, at the same time, of economic approval and legal con-
demnation."
I Mr. Charles Nagel, addressing the students of the Washington Uni-
versity School of Law on The Evolution of the Sherman Act, recently stated
his belief that the approval of the Supreme Court under the existing anti-
trust laws may be won for any business transaction which is ethically and
economically sound.
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The "Rule of Reason" itself, first announced in 1911,22 was a
tremendous reversal in the Supreme Court's position, as fre-
quently has been pointed out.23 It is difficult to see how the
idea of fixity in the doctrines of anti-trust law can receive the
support it does in the face of so complete a reversal of previously
accepted views. The reversal, it is true, was a reversal of obiter
dicta; but there is no doubt that the dicta on both sides repre-
sented views which the justices adhering to them would have
applied had occasion arisen. The Rule of Reason has, of course,
since operated to permit industrial mergers whose illegality
under the earlier view is beyond question. 24
Scarcely less important a reversal, although a less obvious one,
occurred in the decisions upon "open price" arrangements main-
tained by trade associations. Under such an arrangement the
primary function of the trade association is to gather statistics
and other information, largely from its members, and to redis-
tribute this information in digestible form to the members.
Thus each producer is supplied with facts concerning, among
other things, the production, stocks on hand, costs, and prices
of his competitors and can shape his own policies in the light of
actual conditions. In the Hardwood Lumber case,25 decided in
1921, the Supreme Court sustained an injunction decree which
forbade such activities, largely because the secretary of the
trade association indulged in exhortation to the members, there-
by, as the court thought, revealing a purpose to curtail produc-
tion and enhance prices. The decision caused a "storm of
protest in the business world.112 Less than five years later an
association in the same industry, whose reporting of informa-
• 'In U. S. v. Standard Oil Co., n. 8 above, and U. S. v. American Tobacco
Co., n. 11 above.
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, op. cit. n. 17 above, 46. Accord-
ing to the "Rule of Reason," as the phrase implies, the Sherman Act was con-
strued to mean that only unreasonable contracts and combinations in re-
straint of trade are illegal. The earlier view, expressed in U. S. v. Trans-
Missouri Freight Assn. (1897) 166 U. S. 290 and other cases, was that all
such contracts and combinations, whether reasonable or unreasonable, were
in violation of the Act.
N. 8 above. Compare Northern Securities Co. v. U. S. (1904) 193 U. S.
197.
N. 14 above.
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, op. cit. n. 20 above, 91.
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tion lent itself more readily to price fixing than that in the
earlier case, was sustained as legal, there being no evidence that
prices actually had been fixed.27 In this case information re-
garding single members of the association was not distributed,
but reports containing generalized statistics were made. In-
cluded in these statistics was the average cost of production of
various grades of hardwood flooring, computed periodically by
the association from data furnished by members. A book was
also prepared, showing the freight rates on such flooring from
Cadillac, Michigan, a central point in the association's territory,
to destinations throughout the United States. The majority of
the Court refused in this instance to be governed by the fear
that the average cost of production would be used as a base, to
which the quoted freight rates and an agreed percentage of
profit would be added, so as in effect to fix the prices on flooring.
In at least two instances special circumstances have led the
Court to approve what were in effect limited arrangements to
control production or fix prices. In the Window Glass case 2 all
of the manufacturers of hand-blown window glass in the country
agreed with a trade union, representing all of the hand workers,
upon a wage scale and upon the operation of each plant for only
half of the working year. There were not enough workers to
serve all of the plants full time. The Court was convinced that
the industry was dying before the advance of machine-made
glass. Hence it upheld the agreement despite the government's
contention that hand-blown glass was higher in quality and had
its own market and that the defendants were enabled by the
agreement to fix prices.
In Chicago Board of Trade v. U. S.20 the Court upheld a rule
of the Board, binding upon its 1600 members, to the effect that
prices offered for grain in transit to Chicago in all private trans-
actions of members should remain from one day to the next at
the closing bid made upon the floor of the exchange. A simple
doctrine that price fixing is illegal would have led to an injunc-
tion against the Board's rule, as it did in the district court. The
'"Maple Flooring Assn. v. U. S. (1925) 268 U. S. 563.
= Window Glass Mfrs. v. U. S. (1923) 263 U. S. 403.
(1918) 246 U. S. 231.
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Supreme Court, however, reversed the case and in an opinion by
Mr. Justice Brandeis used the following oft-quoted language:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed
is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition. To determine that question the court
must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business
to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and
after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the re-
straint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting
the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be at-
tained, are all relevant facts.
A court which permits such an expression to stand can
scarcely be said to have become irrevocably committed to specific
doctrines limiting the possibility of control of an industry by its
members. The significance of the foregoing language, however,
can only be determined in connection with the attitude of the
court in other similar matters.
IV. FEDERAL CONTROL UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
The shifting decisions of the Supreme Court upon the con-
stitutionality of Federal and state regulatory legislation have
been a favorite topic of discussion in legal and economic litera-
ture.30 No realistic student of the United States Reports can
retain the slightest faith in the utility of doctrinal distinctions
between police power measures which are valid and statutes that
infringe upon the guaranties of due process contained in the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution. Ju-
dicial language which sets forth the right of free contract and
defines in general terms the scope of its immunity from legis-
lative interference cannot hope to explain why a maximum work-
ing day of eight hours may be prescribed for mines and smelter-
ies 3' but not one of ten hours for bakeries;32 why maximum
'Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court
(1927) 40 HARv. L. REv. 943, is a useful review of the decisions of the Su-
preme Court of the United States upon this point. References are there
given to earlier surveys in legal periodicals. For an exhaustive analysis
of the development of the concept of due process of law see MoTT, DUE
PROCESS OF LAW (1926).
' Holden v. Hardy (1898) 169 U. S. 366.
2 Lochner v. N. Y. (1905) 198 U. S. 45.
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hours of work33 but not minimum wages 34 for women may be
established by law; why the commissions of fire insurance
agents3" but not the fees of employment agencies36 may be fixed
by legislation; or how it is that railroads cannot be forbidden to
discharge men on account of membership in a labor union37 but
may be prohibited from exerting pressure upon their employees
to prevent a free choice of means of collective bargaining.8 To
resolve such apparent conflicts in the decisions requires a resort
to factors which are revealed imperfectly, if at all, in the opin-
ions of judges. If, therefore, it were contended that the re-
quirement of a license for the development of oil-bearing land
would deprive landowners and lessees of their property without
due process of law, the soundness of the contention could not be
appraised by merely resorting to the cases. Not even the de-
cision invalidating a state statute which provided for regulation
of the selling price of gasoline, upon the ground that the gasoline
business is not "affected with a public interest, ' 39 is conclusive-
especially when the court admits 40 that the "established test"
which it is applying is indefinite. It is not unthinkable that a
contrary result might be reached in a case which varied but
slightly from the one already decided.4 1
Supposedly a more serious obstacle to Federal regulation of
the oil industry than the due process requirement is the fact
that only interstate commerce is subject to Congress' regulatory
power. It is generally recognized that control of the production
of petroleum is the key to control of the industry. The com-
petitive scramble for a limited, "fugitive" natural resource brings
forth an unneeded flood of oil.42 It is the unavoidable effort to
"Radice v. N. Y. (1924) 264 U. S. 292.
"Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923) 261 U. S. 525.
"O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1931) 51 S. Ct. 131.
"Ribnik v. McBride (1928) 277 U. S. 350.
"Adair v. U. S. (1908) 208 U. S. 161.
1 Tex & N. 0. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S. Clerks (1930) 281
U. S. 548.
'Williams v. Standard Oil Co. (1929) 278 U. S. 235.
e At p. 239.
The Fourteenth Amendment has not prevented the supreme courts of
the three most important oil-producing states from upholding drastic re-
strictions upon the production of petroleum. See below, pp. 228, 235, 241.
1 For the physical factors which intensify the oil problem as compared
with those of other natural resources see below, p. 221.
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dispose somehow of this flood which is the cause of most of the
difficulty in the industry. Because the Suprene Court has
stated in a number of cases4 8 that production of commodities is
not interstate commerce, most commentators have concluded
that Federal regulation of the industry, which must have con-
trol of production for its object, is impossible. 44 As a matter of
mere words the contention is plausible. Indeed it is possible
that it would prevail in a decision involving the point. Yet it
stands conceded in even the Supreme Court's most reactionary
decision,4" and it is of course true that in other connections
Federal control has reached far back into the production of
goods4" and the ownership of producing concerns, 47 as well as
Coe v. Errol (1886) 116 U. S. 517, Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co.
(1922) 260 U. S. 245, and Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord (1923) 262 U. S. 172,
upholding state and local taxes on products ready for shipment in inter-
state commerce; U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co. (1895) 156 U. S, 1, holding that
the manufacture of sugar is not interstate commerce and hence not subject
to the Sherman Act; United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co. (1922)
259 U. S. 344, holding that prevention of the mining of coal intended for
shipment in interstate commerce is not necessarily interference with such
commerce; Del. L. & W. R. Co. v. Yurkonis (1915) 238 U. S. 439, holding
that the Federal Employers' Liability Act does not apply to a worker en-
gaged in mining coal for use in locomotives operating in interstate com-
merce; Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918) 247 U. S. 251, holding that the em-
ployment of child labor in the manufacture of goods shipped in interstate
commerce cannot be subjected to national control.
"Veasey, Legislative Control of the Business of Producing Oil and Gas
(1927) 52 A.B. A. REP. 577 at 587; HAYDEN, FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE
PRoDuCTIoN or OIL (1929) c. 10; LOGAN, THE STABILIZATION o THE PE-
TRoLEU INDusTRY (1930) 195-197.
"Hammer v. Dagenhart, n. 43 above, at p. 270.
"Pittsburgh Melting Co. v. Totten (1918) 248 U. S. 1, upholding the
Federal Meat Inspection Act; Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers
(1925) 268 U. S. 295, holding that interference with the production of coal
for the conscious purpose of preventing shipments in interstate commerce
comes within the Sherman Act. In Dahnke-Walker Co. v. Bondurant
(1921) 257 U. S. 282 a contract of purchase of grain, to be performed with-
in a state, was held to be in interstate commerce because the grain was to
be delivered on board cars for shipment in such commerce.
? Much of the operation of the anti-trust acts would be impossible with-
out a foundation in the view, now largely taken for granted, that the power
of Congress extends to the regulation of the ownership of the means of
production. For an account of the implied reversal of the Knight case,
n. 43 above, by later decisions, see TAFT, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ANTI-TRuST ACT (1914) c. III.
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forward over dealings with goods which previously have been
subjects of interstate commerce. 48
The problem, then, appears to revolve about the question of
whether the Supreme Court can be made to see that the produc-
tion of petroleum affects interstate commerce. At least one
series of cases indicates that the task need not be regarded as
hopeless.
In Hopkins v. U. S.49 the question was over the legality under
the Sherman Act of an agreement among commission merchants
at the Kansas City stockyards, whereby they fixed the rates of
commission they would charge, limited the number of solicitors
of business each would employ, and agreed not to do business
with non-members of their exchange. Cattle were consigned to
the defendants from other states and were sold to purchasers
who immediately shipped them in interstate commerce. The
Kansas City stockyards were the only available market for many
of the defendants' clients. The court held that the business of
the defendants was not interstate commerce and that their
agreement, whether in restraint of that business or not, was not
subject to the Sherman Act. A general reading of the opinion
would lead to the view that the business of the defendants could
not be subjected to Federal control.50
In the subsequent case of Swift & Co. v. U. S., 1 in which a
'Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stone Cutters' Association (1927) 274 U. S.
37, holding that a refusal of union men to work on stone after its shipment
in interstate commerce for the reason that it was cut by non-union labor,
falls within the Sherman Act. The Court reasoned that the purpose was
to prevent further shipments.
(1898) 171 U. S. 578.
M The basis of the decision is not entirely clear, however, for the Court
goes on to say that "It is possible that exorbitant charges for the use of
these defendants' facilities might have a similar effect as a burden on
commerce that a charge upon commerce itself might have. In a case like
that the remedy would probably be forthcoming." Thus it apparently was
recognized, despite the general tenor of the opinion, that activities which
bear upon interstate commerce in a manner which the Court can recognize
may be subjected to the control of Congress. A companion case, Anderson
v. U. S., 171 U. S. 604, involving the similar activities of "yard traders," or
buyers of cattle, is decided upon the ground that the defendants' activities,
though possibly having to do with interstate commerce, did not restrain it
directly enough to come within the Sherman Act. Hence the basis of the
decision in effect is the same as in the Hopkins case.
(1905) 196 U. S. 375.
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conspiracy of the meat packers as purchasers to control the
prices of live animals at the stockyards and as sellers to monop-
olize the trade in fresh meats was charged, the court found there
was a sufficient basis for distinguishing the Hopkins case and
holding that the Sherman Law applied. In the course of the
opinion, however, the Court went farther and said:
When cattle are sent for sale from a place in one state,
with the expectation that they will end their transit, after
purchase, in another, and when in effect they do so, with
only the interruption necessary to find a purchaser at the
stockyards, and when this is a typical, constantly recur-
ring course, the current thus existing is a current of com-
merce among the states, and the purchase of the cattle is a
part and incident of such commerce.
Thus the logic of the opinion pointed clearly to a reversal of the
doctrine of the Hopkins case.
Such a reversal took place in Stafford v. Wallace,52 in which
the constitutionality of the Packers and Stockyards ActV3 was
upheld. That Act subjects not only the packers but the commis-
sion men and dealers at the stockyards-the very parties in-
volved in the Hopkins and Anderson cases--to regulation by the
Secretary of Agriculture. The Secretary's power is broad, be-
ing defined in a number of particulars by reference to the Inter-
state Commerce Act. In the opinion by Chief Justice Taft it is
expressly stated5 ' that any matter affecting interstate com-
merce, whether itself constituting such commerce or not, is sub-
ject to the regulatory power of Congress."
(1922) 258 U. S. 495.
(1921) 42 Stat. 159, 7 U. S. C. sec. 181.
"At p. 521.
'In Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. U. S. (1930) 280 U. S. 420, the constitu-
tionality of the rate-fixing features of the Act was specifically upheld.
Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen (1923) 262 U. S. 1, is similar in its
reasoning to Stafford v. Wallace. In it the Grain Futures Act (1922) 42
Stat. 998, 7 U. S. C. sec. 1, is sustained although the powers conferred upon
the Secretary of Agriculture extend to regulation of future trading, a large
part of which represents purely paper transactions. The Court, aided by
a "recital and finding" incorporated in sec. 3 of the Act, concluded that
future trading bears vitally upon interstate commerce in grain. It was
also held that grain temporarily in elevators at Chicago, although subject
to local taxation, is also subject to regulation by Congress. Thus is demon-
strated the futility of arguing by analogy from tax cases to matters of
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V. THE ROLE OF LEGAL TECHNIQUE
In each of the foregoing classes of cases the same doctrinal
foundation has served as a basis for conflicting decisions. The
predictability of these decisions, so far as that is determined ac-
cording to accepted legal methods, has been at a minimum. The
clear lesson of such a record is that the language of the Supreme
Court canhot validly be made the basis of forecasts, gloomy or
otherwise, regarding the validity of future methods of control
of the petroleum industry or of any other industry. Rather
must the determining factors be sought elsewhere. Two major
possibilities suggest themselves.
Convincing data can be adduced in support of the view that
the factor which really determines court decisions in matters of
industrial control is what may be called the psychology of
judges-that is, the judges' general views of policy and their
instinctive reactions to unfamiliar proposals. These, it may be
maintained, depend upon influences which antedate by far the
argument in a .particular case and cannot be affected by any-
thing that parties or their counsel may do. Thus the decisions
cited above,56 striking down minimum wage laws and upholding
maximum hour laws, were rendered by the same nine judges
with reference to the employment of women under substantially
similar conditions. The same doctrines of constitutional law
were involved. The minimum wage law had the benefit of an
elaborate argument in its support. In both cases there was
directly applicable precedent in support of the statute in ques-
tion,5 7 although in the case sustaining a previous minimum wage
statute the law did not command the support of an actual ma-
jority of the Supreme Court. Very possibly the decisions in the
two cases were opposed because, as the opinions of Mr. Justice
Sutherland indicated, the majority of the court was wedded to
the idea, which argument could not shake, that the wage feature
of the labor contract is more fundamental and immune from
governmental interference than any other.
regulation, as many writers still do. See HAYDEN, op. cit. n. 44 above.
Compare book review (1930) 9 TEx. L. REv. 120.
" See nn. 33 and 34 above.
" Maximum hour laws had been sustained in Muller v. Oregon (1908) 208
U. S. 412 and Bunting v. Oregon (1917) 243 U. S. 426. Minimum wage laws
for women had been sustained by an evenly divided court in Stetler v.
O'Hara (1917) 243 U. S. 629.
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It can be demonstrated, also, that a number of the important
reversals which have occurred in the history of the Supreme
Court are explainable in terms of the Court's changing personnel.
Thus not a single judge reversed his position to bring about the
adoption of the Rule of Reason in the application of the Sher-
man Act. The change was accompanied by a largely altered
personnel upon the Court. 8 In connection with the legality of
"open price" trade associations only a single justice voted dif-
ferently in the two principal cases.r In the matter of the con-
'The latest important case in which the Rule of Reason had been re-jected was U. S. v. Joint Traffic Assn. (1898) 171 U. S. 505. The following
table shows the positions of the Justices in that and in the Standard Oil
case:
For the Rule of Against the Rule of
Reason Reason
Fuller
Brewer
U. S. v. Joint Traffic Assn. Gray Brown
Shiras Peckham
Both cases White Harlan
McKenna
Holmes
U. S. v. Standard Oil Co., Day
n. 8 above Lurbon
Hughes
Lamar
VanDevanter
The following table shows their positions:
For the Plan Against the Plan
Clarke
U. S. v. American Column & VanDevanter
Lbr. Co., n. 14 above Day
McKenna Pitney
Holmes Taft
Both cases Brandeis McReynolds
VanDevanter Sanford
Maple Flooring Assn. v. U. S., Sutherland
n. 27 above. Stone
Butler
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stitutional freedom of employers to employ economic coercion in
battling labor unions, Mr. Justice Hughes, who dissented in a
pre-war case involving the point,6" was placed in the position as
Chief Justice of being able in 1930 to write the opinion of a
unanimous court in substantial accord with his earlier views.('
Only one Justice who had agreed to the earlier decision partici-
pated in deciding the later one.62 Other instances of reversals,
partially explainable in terms of the Court's changing personnel,
might be cited.
If the foregoing view of the matter be accepted, it becomes of
little avail to discuss the basis of judicial decisions in the class of
cases here under discussion. The manner of selection of the
Justices of the Supreme Court becomes the only important ques-
tion. And since, after all, the inclinations of a prospective Jus-
tice, even after his record has been investigated, are not capable
of exact determination, an agnostic view of the probable course
of the Court's adjudications becomes the only possible one to
take. 3
The alternative view of the determining factors in the class of
decisions here under discussion is that matters of fact rather
than merely of legal doctrine or judicial psychology are de-
termining. Whether a newly-enacted regulatory measure takes
property without due process of law depends upon the circum-
stances. How far certain practices or conditions in a business
or industry bear upon interstate commerce can only be ascer-
tained by examining the general situation. Whether a given re-
straint of trade is reasonable or unreasonable depends upon the
facts. It seems fairly obvious, therefore, that the technique of
marshalling and presenting facts to a court and the judicial
technique of dealing with them are of central importance.
Judges do not function in a vacuum. Their psychology, im-
portant though it may be, must operate upon a situation which
is presented to them. And since the presentation and compre-
hension of that situation in each case are the. factors most
definitely subject to manipulation for effect, they seem of central
" Coppage v. Kansas (1915) 236 U. S. 1.
Tex. and N. 0. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S. Clerks, n. 38 above.
" Mr. Justice VanDevanter. Mr. Justice Holmes dissented in the earlier
case. Mr. Justice McReynolds did not take part in the later one.
0 See note (1930) 30 COL. L. REV. 360.
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importance to lawyers and others who are interested .in guiding
the course of judicial decision in matters of industrial control.
The art of presenting facts to a court, of course, is as old as
the practice of law. But the facts whose presentation is a mat-
ter of concern in the ordinary case are quite different from those
which are involved in a constitutional decision. In a personal
injury case, for instance, the purpose of the testimony ordinarily
is to enable the jury to form a correct (or incorrect) picture of
the occurrence upon which the suit is based. The rules of evi-
dence are designed to preserve the purity of the information
thus furnished. Facts of common knowledge are supplied
through the medium of judicial notice or from the jury's store
of everyday information. If the case is appealed the testimony
preserved in the record and the appellate court's stock of general
knowledge ordinarily suffice for the purposes of decision. If,
either at the trial or upon appeal, counsel wish to induce the
court to announce an alleged rule of law, such as that certain
conduct is negligence per se, it is the oral or written argument
(printed brief) upon which the principal reliance is placed. So
long as this argument is conceived to be purely doctrinal in
character no question of the presentation or consideration of
facts is involved. But if, for example, counsel were to deem it
desirable to argue for a new rule of law in the light of the increas-
ing use of the automobile, it would be necessary to present facts
regarding this modern phenomenon. So long as the court were
willing to accept them, these facts might simply be stated in the
brief with such supporting authorities as counsel might deem it
desirable to include. But if questions regarding the reliability
of these alleged facts were raised, it would become important to
consider whether the proper method of presenting them had
been employed. In any event counsel would have done less than
a thoroughly competent piece of work if equally as great care
and thought had not been expended upon the presentation of
these "background" facts as upon the testimony in the immediate
case.
It is these "background" facts which are of central importance
in constitutional cases and, to a lesser extent, in anti-trust litiga-
tion. Whether a minimum wage law is constitutional does not
depend upon the facts relating to the employment of the young
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woman who may have been induced to challenge it. It turns,
rather, upon the facts relating to the employment of the thou-
sands of women who come under the law. The immediate facts
in the case, analogous to those presented in an ordinary lawsuit,
have to do simply with the question of whether the young woman
actually is being employed for less than the minimum. Usually
that is admitted. And the "background" facts, upon which the
real issue turns, may come before the court in various ways
which have not been the subject of much conscious attention.64
In some cases the cleavage between the immediate facts and the
background facts is less clear, as, for example, in a case involv-
ing the alleged confiscatory nature of a rate-fixing statute or
order. It is this inevitable blurring of distinctions, no doubt,
which is responsible for the avoidable lack of clarity with regard
to methods of presentation of background facts. These range
from reliance upon judicial notice to the introduction of formal
testimony.65
Various problems obviously will arise in connection with the
development of an adequate technique for the presentation and
consideration of such background facts. An exclusive reliance
upon formal testimony would be expensive and would create
records of unmanageable size. The rules of evidence, moreover,
are entirely unsuited to sifting reliable testimony of this sort
from unreliable66 The introduction of facts into the argument
and briefs is subject to no formal check as to accuracy, and
again the bulk of the material is likely to become unmanageable.
Very probably increasing reliance will be placed upon additional
fact-determining agencies, such as administrative bodies, to
"Op. cit. n. 63. An illuminating discussion is contained in Bikld, Ju-
dicial Determinations of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional
Validity of Legislative Action (1924) 38 HAav. L. REV. 6, in which alter-
native ways of handling the problem of factual presentation are suggested.
See also MOTT, op. cit. n. 30 above, c. 24; FRANKFURTER & LANDIs, THE
BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT (1928) 308-315.
'In a recent case Mr. Chief Justice Hughes complained that "No facts
as to actual consequences are brought to our attention, either by the record
or by argument. . . . We are left to the inadequate guidance of judicial
notice." (Italics the writer's.) Willcuts v. Bunn (1931) 51 S. Ct. 125 at 129.
"Many rules of evidence are designed to exclude testimony relating to
matters which are outside the witness' personal knowledge. Economic and
sociological data, except in small part, cannot be known personally to any
person.
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pass judgment upon the facts before their submission to a
court 67 or upon research bureaus attached to the courts, whose
function it would be to check up on facts supplied by counsel and
to fill gaps in the data.
Be the solutions to the foregoing problems what they will,
the bearing of these questions upon the probable success of ef-
forts to subject an industry, such as the petroleum industry,
to control is clear. The doctrines of anti-trust law and of
constitutional law throw little light upon the fate of measures
of control when these are called in question in court. The
outcome depends, at least to a considerable extent, upon the
manner in which the plight of the industry and the factual
relation of the measures selected to a solution are presented
to the courts. If a merger or trade' agreement is effected
which givds promise of eliminating the obvious evils of overpro-
duction without subjecting consumers to undue price burdens, it
should be possible to make that clear and to secure a favorable
reaction from judges. Certainly the doctrinal obstacles, which
are those most greatly feared, are insubstantial. Similarly if
the excessive flood of petroleum issuing from the ground throws
interstate commerce into disorder and threatens to diminish the
ultimate supply of oil through the weakening of producing and
marketing agencies, there is ample precedent for the view that
the Supreme Court can be convinced of the constitutionality of
Congress' assuming control of production. Certainty, of course,
cannot be had; but certainty is not an outstanding characteristic
of human affairs. A realization that the focus of constitutional
law has shifted from substantive rules to methods of procedure
should prove a fruitful source of progress.
' See BIKLE, op. cit. n. 64 above, for the applicability of this procedure to
constitutional questions.
